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Abstract: We find that trade and domestic market size are robust 
determinants of economic growth over the 1960-1996 period 
when trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of 
imports and exports relative to GDP in PPP US$ (“real 
openness”). When trade openness is measured as the US dollar 
value of imports and exports relative to GDP in exchange rate 
US$ (“nominal openness”) however, trade and the size of 
domestic markets are often non-robust determinants of growth. 
We argue that real openness is the more appropriate measure of 
trade and that our empirical results should be seen as evidence in 
favor of the extent-of-the-market hypothesis (JEL F43, O40). 
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1.   Introduction 
The effect of trade and extent of the market on growth is a recurring issue in economics. 
Raised by Adam Smith more than two centuries ago, it is still debated today. For example, 
empirical work by Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b), and Masters and 
McMillan (2001) finds that trade and the extent of the domestic market are not robust 
determinants of economic growth for the 1960-1990 period. But Ades and Glaeser (1999), 
Frankel and Romer (1999), Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000, 2003), and Frankel 
and Rose (2002) argue that access to larger markets fostered economic growth over the 
same period. Our objective here is to examine whether trade and extent of the market were 
robust determinants of cross-country economic growth for the 1960-1996 period. 
  One of the challenges in answering this question is that trade is endogenous and may 
be driven by economic growth. Identifying the effect of trade on economic growth 
therefore requires an approach that can disentangle the two directions of causality. This can 
be done by using instruments for trade, an approach pursued by Ades and Glaeser (1999), 
Frankel and Romer (1999), Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), and Frankel and Rose 
(2002) for example. We will follow their lead and use geographic characteristics of 
countries to identify the effect of trade on economic growth. 
  When determining the effect of trade and extent of the market on economic growth it is 
necessary to account for other factors that may explain growth. One of the most important 
variables is institutional quality, which has been shown to be positively correlated with 
growth by Knack and Keefer (1995), Knack (1996), and Keefer and Knack (1997)). Sala-i-
Martin (1997a,b) has demonstrated that this correlation is robust to the inclusion of many 
other explanatory variables. Moreover, Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) have shown, using instruments for institutional quality, that there is a 
positive causal effect running from institutions to productivity. We therefore always 
include institutional quality in our empirical analysis and address the potential endogeneity 
problem (and the measurement error problem) following the work of HJ and AJR.    2
  A very recent, rapidly growing econometric literature emphasizes various important 
statistical problems that may arise when instrumental-variables estimators are based on 
low-quality instruments (e.g. Stock and Staiger (1997), Kleibergen (2001, 2002), Moreira 
(2003), Hahn and Hausman (2003)). Low-quality (weak) instruments (among other things) 
invalidate the standard limiting distributions of instrumental-variables estimators, which 
implies that hypotheses cannot be tested using standard statistics. Following this literature, 
we implement test statistics that are asymptotically valid in the presence of weak 
instruments (Kleibergen (2001, 2002), and Moreira (2003)). Moreover, we also use 
estimators that have been shown to be more robust to weak-instrument problems than two-
stage least-squares (Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002), Hahn and Hausman (2003)). 
  While there is an emerging consensus on institutional quality as a key determinant of 
economic performance, there seems to be no agreement on which other variables should 
always be accounted for in growth regressions. This introduces a difficulty for empirical 
work as the list of candidates is by now rather long. We focus on those explanatory 
variables that have been shown to be most robust in the empirical work of Sala-i-Martin 
(1997a,b) and Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003). 
  Trade openness can be measured in different ways. For example, Ades and Glaeser 
(1999), Frankel and Romer (1999), Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), and Frankel 
and Rose (2002) measure trade openness using the US dollar value of imports and exports 
relative to GDP in exchange rate US$ (which we refer to as nominal openness). This very 
natural measure of trade openness is not without potential drawbacks. We therefore 
consider two alternatives. Our first alternative measure is the US dollar value of imports 
and exports relative to GDP in PPP US$ (which we refer to as real openness). Our second 
alternative measure of trade openness is real openness predicted by the geographic 
characteristics of countries (which has the advantage of being exogenous but the 
disadvantage of capturing only a part of trade openness). 
  To see one of the potential drawbacks of nominal openness compared to real openness 
as a measure of trade openness, consider two countries that are identical in terms of the 
quantities of goods produced and traded. But suppose that one of the two countries has a 
higher relative price of non-traded goods  (maybe because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect   3
associated with a higher level of total factor productivity). In this case the two countries 
have different values of nominal trade openness, although they trade the same quantities by 
construction. Using the value of imports and exports relative to PPP GDP (real openness) 
as the measure of trade openness yields that both countries are equally open. This potential 
drawback of using GDP in exchange rate US$ to normalize determinants of cross-country 
growth is why explanatory variables like private and public investment, the size of 
government, government consumption, and many others are always measured relative to 
GDP in PPP US$ (e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b)). 
  To see a second, related potential drawback of nominal openness, suppose that the 
higher relative price of non-traded goods in one of the aforementioned countries is in fact 
driven by the Balassa-Samuelson effect. In this case the country with higher average labor 
productivity will have lower nominal openness.
1 This could lead (a simple minded) 
observer to conclude that trade may be bad for productivity (although the two countries 
trade the same quantities by construction). 
  A third potential drawback of nominal trade openness is discussed in Alcalá and 
Ciccone (2003). There it is shown that nominal openness may be decreasing in the degree 
of specialization in a model with increasing returns to specialization (motivated by the 
work of Helpman (1981) and Krugman (1981)). The reason is that specialization may 
increase productivity relatively more in the traded-goods sector and therefore translate into 
higher non-traded goods prices, which may reduce nominal openness. Hence, nominal 
openness may be negatively correlated with average labor productivity although trade, by 
allowing for specialization, increases productivity.
2 AC use the same model to show that 
real openness is monotonically increasing in the degree of specialization. 
  Our empirical results on the effect of trade and extent of the market on economic 
growth 1960-1996 indicate that the extent of the market is often a non-robust determinant 
                                                             
1 This is because the country with higher total factor productivity, which due to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect has higher non-traded goods prices and lower nominal openness, 
requires less labor to produce the same quantity of goods as the country with lower total 
factor productivity. 
2 AC also show that the drawbacks of nominal openness persist even if trade is 
instrumented. This is because exogenous variables raising trade and increasing the degree 
of specialization will increase the price level.   4
of economic growth when nominal openness is used to measure trade. But when we 
measure trade using real openness or geography-fitted real openness, the effect of trade and 
extent of the market on growth is robust to the inclusion of institutional quality and the 
controls emphasized by Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003). Moreover, trade 
matters more in countries with smaller domestic markets, confirming the hypothesis of 
Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000). This interaction effect between trade and 
domestic market size turns out to be crucial for testing the extent-of-the-market 
hypothesis: eliminating it usually results in both trade and domestic market size being 
insignificant determinants of 1960-1996 growth rates. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 discusses the 
most closely related literature. Section 3 presents the empirical framework. Section 4 
explains the data sources. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   Related Literature 
The partial correlation between nominal openness and economic growth in a cross-country 
context is analyzed in Levine and Renelt (1992) and Harrison (1996). These studies tend to 
find a positive correlation but LR argue that this correlation is not robust to the inclusion of 
other variables explaining economic growth. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-
Martin (1997a,b) include working-age population as a control for domestic market size in 
their empirical work on the determinants of economic growth and find that this variable is 
not robust.  
  A more recent analysis of the effect of trade and extent of the market on economic 
growth can be found in Ades and Glaeser (1999), Frankel and Romer (1999), Alesina, 
Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), Masters and McMillan (2001), and Frankel and Rose 
(2002).
3 These studies have in common that they use nominal openness as a trade measure 
and that they consider trade and some measure of domestic size as joint determinants of 
economic growth. The basic idea is that the extent of the market depends on both variables.  
Possible reverse causation from economic growth to openness is addressed using 
geography-based instruments for trade in AG, Frankel&Romer, ASW, and Frankel&Rose. 
                                                             
3 Wacziarg (2001) examines the growth effects of policy-driven trade flows.   5
MM address this issue by using nominal openness at the beginning of the sample period as 
their trade measure. The main difference between these studies is that AG, 
Frankel&Romer, ASW, and Frankel&Rose find support for the extent-of-the market 
hypothesis, while MM argue that the evidence for this hypothesis is not robust.
4 
  The study most closely related to our empirical work is Alesina, Spolaore, and 
Wacziarg (2000) (for extensions and further empirical results see Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2002) as well as Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2003)). We follow their lead in using 
population size as a measure of domestic market size and, crucially, in allowing trade 
openness to have a stronger effect in countries with a smaller domestic market.
5 Without 
the interaction effect between domestic market size and trade, both domestic market size 
and trade usually turn insignificant as determinants of 1960-1996 growth rates. The main 
difference between Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000, 2003) (and Spolaore and 
Wacziarg (2002)) and our work is that, in addition to using nominal openness as a trade 
measure, we also employ two alternative measures, real openness and geography-fitted real 
openness.
6 A second difference with ASW is that we account for institutional quality as a 
possible determinant of cross-country growth. Moreover, we draw on the work of Sala-i-
Martin (1997a,b)) and especially Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003) to identify 
the most important “other” control variables to be included in the empirical analysis. 
  Frankel and Rose (2002) also account for institutional quality when analyzing the 
effect of trade and domestic market size on economic growth. The main differences 
between their study and our work are that they only try nominal openness as a trade 
openness measure; that they do not follow Alesina Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) in 
including an interaction effect between trade and domestic market size; and that they do 
not use instruments for institutional quality. 
                                                             
4 They find evidence for the extent-of-the-market hypothesis in the sub-sample of tropical 
countries however. 
5 Ades and Glaeser (1999) also allow for this possibility but measure domestic market size 
using GDP per capita. 
6 The only paper using real openness as a possible determinant of economic growth we are 
aware of is Dollar and Kraay (2003), who apply a panel-data approach in the spirit of 
Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) to decadal growth rates for the period 1970-2000.   6
  Our geography-fitted real openness trade measure is constructed following the work of 
Frankel and Romer (1999). They use a gravity-equation framework to determine the part of 
bilateral trade-shares that can be explained by geographic characteristics and population. 
The geography-fitted bilateral trade shares for each country with the rest of the world are 
then summed up to obtain a measure of geography-fitted real openness (vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world). We employ geography-fitted real openness both as a (exogenous) measure of 
trade openness and as an instrument to estimate the effect of trade on economic growth 
using an instrumental-variables approach. We also use instruments for institutional quality, 
following the work of Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001). 
 
3.  Estimating Equation 
Following the work on the determinants of economic growth by Barro (1991), Mankiw, 
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where  ,19961960 (loglog)*100/36 cc yy -  is the average growth rate of income per capita 
1960-1996; TROpen denotes a measure of trade openness; DMSize a measure of domestic 
market size; IQual a measure of institutional quality; X a series of control variables; and 
1960 log y  the log of initial income per capita. The basic objective of this estimating equation 
is to see whether countries with access to larger markets grew more over the 1960-1996 
period, conditional on their initial income per capita and other factors. We follow Alesina, 
Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2002) in allowing for an 
interaction effect between trade openness and domestic market size; including this   7
interaction term permits trade to matter more (or less) in countries that have smaller 
domestic markets. 
  We try several measures of trade openness and institutional quality in equation (1). In 
particular, we use three measures of trade openness, imports plus exports in US$ divided 
by GDP in exchange rate US$ (NOpen), imports plus exports in US$ divided by GDP in 
PPP US$ (ROpen), and geography-fitted real openness. 
 
4.  Data 
The data on PPP GDP per capita, population, and nominal as well as real openness are 
taken from the PWT 6.1 by Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). The measures of nominal 
and real openness used in equation (1) are averaged over the 1960-1996 period (we use 
1996 as the final year because this is the last benchmark year). The data on institutional 
quality is taken from Hall and Jones (1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 
(2002). HJ construct a measure of government anti-diversion policies using late-1980s data 
from the International Country Risk Guide concentrating, like Knack and Keefer (1995), 
on five of the twenty-four categories provided. KKZL construct a measure of rule of law 
using a large number of late-1990s governance indicators, which they reduce to a single 
rule-of-law index using an unobserved components methodology.
7  The set X of growth 
controls is taken from Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) and Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin 
(2003). These papers propose different methodologies to determine the most robust 
explanatory variables for growth among a large set of candidates. 
  Nominal openness and real openness are instrumented using the approach of Frankel 
and Romer (1999). FR construct their instrument in two steps. The first step consists of 
estimating a gravity equation for 1985 bilateral trade shares (relative to PPP GDP) that 
uses countries’ geographic characteristics and population only as explanatory variables (the 
estimating equation does not include measures of productivity or income), i.e. 
                                                             
7 This index is available for various years. We take the average over the available years for 


























  (2) 
where tij  denotes exports of country  i  to country  j  plus exports from  j  to  i ;  ij Dist  is the 
distance between the two countries;  , ij PopPop  denote the population of the two countries; 
, ij AreaArea  denote the area of the two countries;  , ij LdlLdl  are dummies indicating whether 
countries  , ij  are landlocked;  ij Cb  is a dummy indicating whether or not the two countries 
have a common border; and  ij v  summarizes the variation in bilateral trade shares no 
captured by our empirical approach. The common border dummy is included by itself in the 
regression as well as interacted with other explanatory variables to capture trade between 
neighboring countries more accurately. The ordinary least-squares estimates of the a -
coefficients can be used to determine the predicted value of the bilateral trade share for 
each pair of countries for which there is data on the right-hand-side variables (even if we do 
not have any bilateral trade data for those countries). The second step of the FR procedure 
consists of aggregating the predicted value of bilateral trade shares for each country with all 
other countries to obtain geography-fitted real openness (TRgeofit) 
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  We use the FR approach exactly. The only difference is that we employ more data on 
bilateral trade shares to estimate the gravity-equation. Our 1985 bilateral trade data, taken 
from different Yearbook issues of the Direction of Trade Statistics published by the 
International Monetary Fund, consists of 10569 observations (FR work with 3969 
observations). Alcalá and Ciccone (2003) show that the additional bilateral-trade data 
translates into a considerable improvement in predicting nominal and real openness. We 
also adapt the FR procedure to construct geography-fitted nominal openness 
(TRnomgeofit), which we use as an instrument when we use nominal openness as our trade   9
openness measure. Geography-fitted nominal openness is constructed exactly as 
geography-fitted real openness, only that trade share on the left-hand-side variable of (2) is 
relative to GDP in exchange rate US$. 
Both measures of institutional quality used in equation (1) are only available towards 
the end of the sample period and are therefore endogenous. Moreover, they are probably 
noisy reflections of true institutional quality. To address possible endogeneity and 
measurement-error problems we therefore use the instruments for institutional quality 
suggested by Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). HJ 
instrument institutional quality using the fraction of the population speaking English at 
birth (EngL), the fraction of the population speaking one of the five primary European 
languages at birth (EuroL), and the distance from the equator (AbsLati). They argue, based 
on historical considerations, that these variables are correlated with past European 
influence and therefore with the transmission of the European institutional framework. 
(They check the validity of distance from the equator as an instrument by testing the 
hypothesis that distance from the equator does not affect productivity once institutional 
quality is accounted for and find that this hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional 
significance levels.) AJR suggest settler mortality between the 18
th and 19
th century as an 
instrument for institutional quality in a sample of former colonies. Their argument, also 
based on historical considerations, is that institutions permitting short-run extraction of 
income from colonies were more likely when survival conditions for long-term European 
settlements were unfavorable. Following the argument of AJR, we also use the share of 
inhabitants of European origin in 1900 as an instrument for institutional quality in former 
colonies (this variable is also taken from AJR). 
 
5.  Results 
Least-Squares Results 
Table 1 contains the results of estimating the growth regression in (1) without any extent-
of-the-market variables. The sample size (just below 100) is determined by the number of 
countries where all necessary data are available. Column (1) controls for initial income per 
capita and the five most robust growth controls of Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin   10
(2003). The method of estimation is least squares with robust standard errors 
(homoskedasticity can be rejected at the 5-percent level).  It can be seen that all variables 
are significant at the 5-percent level and that the regression captures 66 percent of the 
variation in growth rates. Columns (2) and (3) add the GADP and RLAW institutional 
controls respectively, and both turn out to be highly significant. These regressions capture 
close to 70 percent of the variation in growth rates. Column (4) controls for initial income 
per capita and the eleven robust growth controls of Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin 
(2003). All controls, except the fraction of Protestants, are significant at the 10-percent 
level (and all but three are significant at the 5-percent level). The regression captures 76 
percent of the variation in growth rates. Columns (5) and (6) add the GADP and RLAW 
institutional quality measure respectively, and both turn out to be highly significant. The 
regressions now capture just under 80 percent of the variation in growth rates. 
Table 2 adds extent-of-the-market variables to the growth regression, using the log of 
1985 geography-fitted real openness as a measure of trade openness and the log of 1960 
population as a measure of domestic market size. The main advantages and disadvantages 
of the geography-fitted trade openness measure have already been mentioned: the 
advantage is that it can be taken as exogenous in the empirical analysis as it is constructed 
without any reference to productivity growth or productivity levels; the disadvantage is 
that it captures only part of trade. The method of estimation is least squares with robust 
standard errors (homoskedasticity can be rejected at the 5-percent level).  It can be seen 
that the extent-of-the-market controls are significant at the 5-percent level in almost all 
cases. This is the case in column (1) where we control for initial income per capita only; in 
column (2) where we control for initial income per capita and GADP; in column (3) where 
we include the two most important growth controls (other than initial GDP per capita) 
according to Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b); in column (4) where we include the three most 
robust growth controls (other than initial GDP per capita) according to Doppelhofer, Miller 
and Sala-i-Martin (2003); in column (5) where we include the five most robust growth 
controls (other than initial GDP per capita) according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-
Martin (2003); and in column (6) where we include the eleven robust control variables 
according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003). In particular, the interaction   11
effect is always significantly negative at the 5-percent level, except in column (2) where it 
is only significant at the 10-percent level. Hence, geography-fitted real openness had a 
greater effect on economic growth rates in countries with smaller domestic markets. The P-
values of the (joint) hypothesis that geography-fitted real openness does not affect 
economic growth over the 1960-1996 period in the last row of the top panel indicate that 
this hypothesis can be rejected at the 2-percent level in all cases. Using RLAW instead of 
GADP (not in the table) as a measure of institutional quality yields very similar results. 
Two-Stage Least-Squares Results 
Table 3 contains the results of estimating the growth regression in (1) using the log of 
average real openness 1960-1996 as a measure of trade openness and the log of 1960 
population as a measure of domestic market size. The method of estimation is TSLS 
(homoskedasticity cannot be rejected at the 10-percent level
8). Column (1) reports the most 
basic specification, without institutional quality or other controls except the initial level of 
income per capita. The instruments used to estimate the equation are the log of geography-
fitted real openness and the log of geography-fitted real openness interacted with domestic 
market size as well as the initial level of income per capita. It can be seen that the results 
indicate very significant effects of trade and domestic market size on 1960-1996 growth 
rates and also that trade openness mattered more for growth in countries that had smaller 
1960 domestic market, confirming the hypothesis of Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 
(2000). Column (2) adds the GADP measure of institutional quality to the empirical 
analysis and the three variables suggested by Hall and Jones (1999) to the instrument list 
(the fraction of the population speaking English at birth; the fraction of the population 
speaking one of the five primary European languages at birth; and the distance from the 
equator). Adding institutional quality results in a somewhat lower effect of trade openness 
and domestic market size but both effects remain significant at the 5-percent level. 
Moreover, the negative interaction term, indicating that trade mattered more for countries 
with smaller domestic markets, is significant at the 7-percent level. The overidentifying 
restriction is rejected for this specification however (last row of the bottom panel). Column 
                                                             
8 The heteroskedasticity tests that we use are those recommended by Baum, Schaffer, and 
Stillman (2003) for instrumental-variables regressions.   12
(3) augments the specification with the two growth controls that Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) 
considers most important. The instruments used are those of the second column plus the 
two variables that have been added. Again, the effect of trade openness and domestic 
market size falls somewhat but is still significant at the 5- and 7-percent level respectively. 
The negative interaction effect is significant at the 9-percent level. The overidentifying 
restriction cannot be rejected at the 10-percent level for this specification. Column (4) uses 
the three most robust growth controls of Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003) 
instead of the two that Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) considers most important. The instruments 
used are those of the second column plus the three controls. Now all the extent-of-the-
market variables are significant at the 5-percent level. But the overidentifying restriction is 
rejected for this specification. Column (5) uses the five most robust growth controls 
according to Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003) (which include the two that 
Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) considers most important). The instruments used are those in the 
third column plus the additional controls. Again, the effects of trade openness and 
domestic market size fall somewhat (compared to the second column) but both remain 
significant at the 5-percent level. The negative interaction effect is also significant at the 5-
percent level. The overidentifying restriction cannot be rejected at the 10-percent level for 
this specification. Column (6) uses the full set of robust growth controls according to 
Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003). The instruments used are those in the third 
column plus the additional controls. The effect of trade openness and domestic market size 
as well as the negative interaction effect remain significant at the 5-percent level. And the 
overidentifying restriction cannot be rejected at the 10-percent level for this specification. 
The last row in the top panel reports the P-values of the (joint) hypothesis that trade does 
not matter for 1960-1996 growth for all specifications (the hypothesis that both the effect 
of trade and the interaction effect are zero). It can be seen that this hypothesis can always 
be rejected at the 8-percent level. Using RLAW instead of GADP (not in the table) as a 
measure of institutional quality yields very similar results. 
Table 4 checks whether the instruments used in the TSLS analysis in Table 3 are 
closely related to institutional quality, real openness, and the interaction term between real 
openness and domestic market size. To investigate this, we regress the three variables on   13
the instruments and the controls used in each specification of Table 3. We then performed 
F-tests for the joint significance of the instruments in these regressions, following Alesina, 
Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000). For example, the first value in the row entitled 
“Specification 1” (16.83) is the F-statistic of excluding all trade-instruments from the first-
stage regression for our measure of trade openness (the log of real openness); the trade 
instruments are the log of geography-fitted trade and the log of geography-fitted trade 
interacted with the log of 1960 population. The second value in the row entitled 
“Specification 1” (17.82) is the F-statistic of excluding all trade-instruments from the first-
stage regression for the interaction term between trade openness and domestic market size. 
The F-statistics and p-values compare favorably to those of Alesina, Spolaore, and 
Wacziarg (2000, 2003) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2002) for example. High F-statistics in 
our application do not necessarily imply that weak-instrument problems are absent 
however. This is because the well-known Staiger and Stock (1997) F-statistic rule of 
thumb applies to models with one endogenous variable only. Intuitively, in models with 
two or more endogenous variables, weak-instrument problems may arise because, even if 
instruments are very significant determinants of each endogenous variable, they may be 
unable to predict the difference between endogenous variables. It is for this reason that we 
will consider test-statistics that are asymptotically valid in the presence of weak 
instruments and use estimators that have been shown to be more robust to weak-instrument 
problems than two-stage least-squares. 
  Table 5 estimates selected specifications of the growth regression in (1) using the log 
of nominal openness as measure of trade openness. The instruments used are identical to 
those used in the specification with the log of real openness, only that we use the log of 
geography-fitted nominal openness instead of geography-fitted real openness (that is, we 
adapt the geography-fitted trade instrument to the trade openness measure used). The 
extent of the market does not seem to be a robust determinant of 1960-1996 growth rates in 
this case. For example, domestic market size is only significant at the 5- or 10-percent 
level in columns (3) and (4) when we control for the three most robust controls according 
to Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003). But in this case, the (joint) hypothesis 
that trade matters for economic growth can be rejected at the 10-percent level (last row of   14
top panel). And the overidentifying restriction can be rejected at the 10-percent level (last 
row of the bottom panel). Moreover, when we control for the eleven robust growth 
controls according to Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003), both the linear effect 
of trade and domestic market size are insignificant at the 10-percent level. The only 
individually significant extent-of-the-market variable is the negative interaction effect. 
Using (the level of) nominal openness instead of log nominal openness as a measure of 
trade openness yields that trade is an even less robust determinant of 1960-1996 growth 
rates. 
  Table 6 estimates the growth regression in (1) using the Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) sample of former colonies and their instruments for institutional quality 
(concentrating on former colonies reduces the sample size to around 66 observations). The 
analysis concentrates on rule of law as a measure of institutional quality, following Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) (rule of law is available for more countries than the 
institutional quality measure used by AJR and RST argue that rule of law is conceptually 
close to the AJR measure). The method of estimation is TSLS and the measure of trade 
openness is the log of real openness. Column (1) reports the extent-of-the-market 
specification without any control variables except the initial level of income per capita and 
institutional quality. The instruments used to estimate the equation are the log of 
geography-fitted real openness, the log of geography-fitted real openness interacted with 
domestic market size, the log of historic settler mortality and the fraction of the population 
with European origin in 1900 from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), and the log 
of the initial level of income per capita.
9 It can be seen that the results indicate very 
significant effects of trade and domestic market size on 1960-1996 growth rates and also 
that trade openness mattered more for growth in countries that had smaller 1960 domestic 
market.  Moreover, the (joint) hypothesis that trade does not matter for economic growth 
can be rejected at the 2-percent level. Column (2) adds the two growth controls that Sala-i-
Martin (1997a,b) considers most important. This results in a somewhat lower effect of 
trade and domestic market size, but both are still significant at the 10-percent level. 
                                                             
9 The institutional quality variable is insignificant at the 10-percent level in all 
specifications in Table 6 when we do not use the fraction of Europeans in 1900 as an 
instrument. The same holds for the extent-of-the-market variables.   15
Moreover, the (joint) hypothesis that trade does not matter for economic growth can be 
rejected at the 9-percent level. Column (3) only uses 1960 primary school enrollment as a 
growth control. 1960 primary school enrollment is the only variable out of the five most 
robust growth controls according to Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2003) that is 
significant at the 10-percent level; the other four growth controls are individually and 
jointly insignificant at the 10-percent level. The effect of trade and domestic market size is 
now significant at the 5-percent level; the (negative) interaction effect is significant at the 
6-percent level. And the (joint) hypothesis that trade matters for economic growth can be 
rejected at the 5-percent level. Column (4) adds a dummy for countries in Subsaharan 
Africa to the analysis. This dummy and the 1960 primary school enrollment are the only 
two variables out of the eleven robust growth controls according to Doppelhofer, Miller, 
and Sala-i-Martin (2003) that are significant at the 10-percent level; the other nine growth 
controls are individually and jointly insignificant at the 10-percent level. Now all the 
extent-of-the-market variables are significant at the 5-percent level. Column (6) eliminates 
1960 primary school enrollment, which is insignificant in the previous column, from the 
analysis. All the extent-of-the-market variables remain significant at the 5-percent level in 
this case. The last row in the bottom panel shows that the overidentifying restriction cannot 
be rejected at the 10-percent level. 
Table 7 checks whether the instruments are closely related to institutional quality, real 
openness, and the interaction term between real openness and domestic market size in the 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) former colonies sample. To investigate this, we 
regress the three variables on the instruments and the controls used in each specification of 
Table 6. We then performed F-tests for the joint significance of the excluded instruments 
in these regressions. The picture emerging from the table is that, according to the F-
statistics, the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) instruments for institutional 
quality work better in the former colonies sample than the Hall and Jones (1999) 
instruments in the largest possible sample. But the geography-fitted trade instruments work 
better in the largest possible sample than in the former colonies sample.   16
(Fuller) LIML Results and Kleibergen Significance Tests 
A very recent, rapidly growing econometric literature emphasizes various important 
statistical problems that may arise when instrumental-variables estimators are based on 
low-quality instruments. The literature also suggests several ways to ensure that results are 
not driven by weak instruments. On the one hand, Kleibergen (2001, 2002) and Moreira 
(2003) suggest test-statistics that are asymptotically valid even if instruments are weak. On 
the other hand, Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) and Hahn and Hausman (2003) suggest 
using Fuller LIML estimators, which they show using Monte-Carlo studies to have better 
finite-sample properties than TSLS estimators when instruments are weak. 
  Table 8 therefore presents Fuller LIML estimates of the effect of real openness and 
domestic market size on 1960-1996 growth. The results are given for two values of the 
Fuller constant, 4 and 1. The Fuller constant 1 results in the most unbiased estimator and is 
recommended when one wants to test hypotheses; the Fuller constant 4 minimizes the 
mean square error of the estimators (Fuller (1977)). It can be seen that Fuller LIML 
estimates are almost identical to TSLS estimates in Table 3. Using RLAW instead of 
GADP (not in the table) as a measure of institutional quality yields very similar results. 
  We also tested the (joint) hypothesis that trade does not matter for 1960-1996 growth 
(the hypothesis that both the effect of trade and the interaction effect are zero) for all 
specifications in Table 3 using the Kleibergen and the Moreira test statistics. The 
Kleibergen tests statistic yields that the hypothesis that trade does not matter can be 
rejected at the 5-percent level for all specifications except the one in column (2) where the 
P-value is 0.068. The Moreira test statistic yields that the hypothesis that trade does not 
matter can in all cases be rejected at the 5-percent level. The results are almost identical 
when we use rule of law to measure institutional quality. 
  Table 9 presents Fuller LIML estimates for the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001) extended former colonies sample. It can be seen that the Fuller LIML results are 
similar to the TSLS results in Table 6. We also tested the hypothesis that trade does not 
matter for 1960-1996 growth for all specifications in Table 6 using the Kleibergen and the 
Moreira test statistics. The Kleibergen tests statistic yields that the hypothesis that trade 
does not matter can be rejected at the 5-percent level for all specifications except the one in   17
column (2) where the P-value is 0.075. The Moreira test statistic yields that the hypothesis 
that trade does not matter can in all cases be rejected at the 5-percent level. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Our empirical results indicate that trade and extent of the market were robust determinants 
of 1960-1996 economic growth. Moreover, trade mattered more for growth where 
domestic markets were smaller, confirming the hypothesis of Alesina, Spolaore, and 
Wacziarg (2000). The interaction effect between trade and domestic market size implies 
that the marginal effect of trade on 1960-1996 economic growth depends on the size of the 
country. Focusing on the country with median population in 1960, our results yield that an 
increase in real openness from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile is associated with a 
0.8 percent increase in the annual growth rate.   18
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PCGDP  GDP per capita, in 1996 PPP US$. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
ROpen   Real Openness. Average of real openness over the period 1960-1996. The value for 
each year is obtained by multiplying the variables COpen and P in Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2002). 
NOpen   Nominal Openness. Average of nominal openness over the period 1960-1996. 
Corresponds to the variable COpen in Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
TRgeofit  Real openness predicted by geographic factors in 1985. Source: Alcalá and 
Ciccone (2003). 
TRnomgeofit  Nominal openness predicted by geographic factors in 1985. Authors’ construction 
following Alcalá and Ciccone (2003) and Frankel and Romer (1999). 
GADP    Government anti-diversion policies. Source: Hall and Jones (1999). 
RLAW   Average of rule of law for periods 1997-1998 and 2000-2001. Source: Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (2002). 
Pop60    Total population in 1960. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) 
 
 
Variables taken from Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003): 
 
LifExp60  Life expectancy in 1960. 
Prim60   Primary school enrollment rate in 1960.  
Sub-Sahara   Dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries.  
Latin America  Dummy for Latin American countries.  
YsOpen   Number of years economy has been open between 1950 and 1994 according to the 
policy criteria of Sachs and Warner (1995). 
Priex    Fraction of primary exports in total exports in 1970. 
Rerd     Real exchange rate distortions. 
Confucian   Fraction of population that follows Confucian religion.  
Muslim   Fraction of population that follows Muslim religion.  
Protestant  Fraction of population that follows Protestant religion.  





Abs(Lat)   Absolute value of latitude. 
EuroL    Fraction of population speaking one of the five primary European languages at 
birth. Source: Hall and Jones (1996).  
EngL   Fraction of population speaking English at birth. Source: Hall and Jones (1996). 
Mort  Historic settler mortality in former colonies. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001). 
Euro1900  Fraction of Europeans in former colonies in 1900. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001). 
   22
 
 
Table 1. Institutional quality and Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003) controls (LS) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                       
               
LogPCGDP60    -1.46  -1.65  -1.48  -1.42  -1.74  -1.50 
    (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.20) 
GADP      2.97      4.17   
      (0.98)      (1.09)   
RLAW        0.65      0.57 
        (0.19)      (0.19) 
Prim60    1.44  2.01  1.97  2.29  2.44  2.49 
    (0.67)  (0.67)  (0.65)  (0.65)  (0.60)  (0.62) 
LifExp60    0.10  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.03 
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
YsOpen    1.87  1.34  1.26  1.41  0.94  1.00 
    (0.44)  (0.46)  (0.65)  (0.39)  (0.38)  (0.40) 
Mining    4.11  3.52  3.60  5.95  5.22  5.58 
    (1.55)  (1.51)  (1.47)  (1.39)  (1.31)  (1.34) 
Confucian    6.10  5.53  5.33  4.71  4.39  4.09 
    (1.66)  (1.60)  (1.59)  (1.50)  (1.39)  (1.45) 
Latin America          -0.61  -0.06  -0.41 
          (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.32) 
Sub-Sahara          -0.68  -0.86  -0.86 
          (0.40)  (0.38)  (0.39) 
Muslim          1.00  1.07  0.82 
          (0.44)  (0.41)  (0.43) 
Protestant          -0.64  -0.97  -0.80 
          (0.46)  (0.43)  (0.49) 
Priex          -0.98  -0.59  -0.82 
          (0.51)  (0.48)  (0.49) 
Rerd          -0.006  -0.004  -0.004 
          (0.003)  0.002  (0.002) 
               
Sample Size    100  99  99  95  95  95 
Rsquared    0.66  0.69  0.69  0.76  0.79  0.79 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is log(PCGDP96/PCGDP60)*100/36, where PCGDP stands for 
PPP GDP per capita. Least-squares estimation (standard errors in parentheses). All regressions 
include a constant. GADP (government anti-diversion policies) is the variable for institutional 
quality used in Hall and Jones (1999). RLAW is the rule of law index of Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-
Lobaton (2002). Columns (1), (2) and (3) include in the specification the five most important 
control variables (other than initial GDP per capita) according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-
Martin (2003). Columns (4), (5) and (6) include in the specification the full set of variables 
robustly related to growth according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003). 
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Table 2. Geography-fitted real openness and GADP (LS) 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Extent-of-Market 
Controls 
                    
               
LogTRgeofit    3.29**  2.32**  1.85**  2.23**  2.15**  1.60** 
    (1.05)  (1.03)  (0.70)  (0.86)  (0.51)  (0.58) 
LogTRgeofit*LogPop60    -0.24**  -0.17*  -0.14**  -0.19**  -0.19**  -0.17** 
    (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
LogPop60    0.74**  0.51**  0.42**  0.52**  0.51**  0.17 
    (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
P-value Hypothesis               
Trade Insignificant     0.0001  0.008  0.012  0.019  0.00008  0.011 
               
Other Controls               
               
LogPCGDP60    0.21  -0.70  -1.64  -0.67  -1.55  -1.65 
    (0.15)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.25) 
GADP      5.76  4.11  3.27  2.38  3.98 
      (1.24)  (1.28)  (1.05)  (1.08)  (1.40) 
Prim60        2.88    1.99  2.43 
        (0.74)    (0.69)  (0.67) 
LifExp60        0.05    0.07  0.03 
        (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.02) 
YsOpen          2.10  1.13  0.68 
          (0.43)  (0.36)  (0.33) 
Mining          3.34  4.70  5.28 
          (2.41)  (1.88)  (1.23) 
Confucian          5.91  5.19  4.23 
          (0.93)  (0.87)  (0.76) 
Latin America              -0.34 
              (0.37) 
Sub-Sahara              -1.17 
              (0.37) 
Muslim              0.94 
              (0.36) 
Protestant              -1.23 
              (0.35) 
Priex              -1.00 
              (0.49) 
RERD              -0.004 
              (0.002) 
Sample Size    98  98  98  98  98  94 
Rsquared    0.25  0.42  0.64  0.56  0.72  0.83 
    24
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is log(PCGDP96/PCGDP60)*100/36, where PCGDP stands for 
PPP GDP per capita. Least-squares estimation (standard errors in parentheses). All regressions 
include a constant. LogTRgeofit is the log of 1985 geography-fitted real openness from Alcalá and 
Ciccone (2003) and is used as the measure of trade openness. GADP (government anti-diversion 
policies) is the variable for institutional quality used in Hall and Jones (1999). In column (3) we 
include the two most important growth controls (other than initial GDP per capita) according to 
Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b). In column (4) we include the three most robust growth control (other than 
GDP per capita) according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003). In column (5) we 
include the five most robust growth controls (other than initial G DP per capita) according to 
Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003). And in column (6) we include the full set of 
variables robustly related to growth according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003). ** 
significant 5% level; * 10% level (significant “other controls” are not marked).   25
 
Table 3. Real openness and GADP (TSLS) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Extent-of-Market 
Controls                      
               
LogROpen    5.69**  3.72**  2.99**  3.01**  2.78**  2.33** 
    (1.55)  (1.65)  (1.45)  (1.29)  (1.14)  (1.22) 
LogROpen* LogPop60    -0.39**  -0.29*  -0.24*  -0.28**  -0.26**  -0.28** 
    (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
LogPop60    3.68**  2.60**  2.15*  2.41**  2.24**  2.06** 
    (1.34)  (1.34)  (1.18)  (1.06)  (0.96)  (0.94) 
P-value Hypothesis               
Trade Insignificant 
  
0.000  0.044  0.079  0.067   0.052  0.046 
               
 Other Controls                      
               
LogPCGDP60    -0.39  -0.77  -1.62  -0.78  -1.55  -1.44 
    (0.27)  (0.41)  (0.33)  (0.31)  (0.29)  (0.34) 
GADP      4.54  3.88  3.34  3.44  2.39 
      (2.75)  (2.82)  (2.40)  (2.46)  (3.99) 
Prim60        2.39    1.86  2.26 
        (0.84)    (0.79)  (0.67) 
LifExp60        0.04    0.04  0.048 
        (0.03)    (0.03)  (0.043) 
YsOpen          2.07  1.13  1.21 
          (0.69)  (0.63)  (0.70) 
Mining          1.48  2.48  5.21 
          (1.79)  (1.79)  (2.02) 
Confucian          5.51  4.75  4.42 
          (1.96)  (1.75)  (1.62) 
Latin America              -0.43 
              (0.69) 
Sub-Sahara              -0.87 
              (0.44) 
Muslim              1.02 
              (0.46) 
Protestant              -1.55 
              (0.60) 
Priex              -1.01 
              (0.68) 
Rerd              -0.003 
              (0.003) 
Sample Size    98  98  98  98  98  95 
P-value Overidentifying 
Restrictions    --  0.02  0.22  0.04  0.19  0.72   26
 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is log(PCGDP96/PCGDP60)*100/36, where PCGDP stands for 
PPP GDP per capita. Two-stage least-squares (TSLS) estimation. All regressions include a 
constant. LogROpen is the log of average real openness 1960-1996. GADP (government anti-
diversion policies) is the variable for institutional quality used in Hall and Jones (1999). In column 
(3) we include the two most important growth controls (other than initial GDP per capita) 
according to Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b). In column (4) we include the three most robust growth 
control (other than initial GDP per capita) according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin 
(2003). In column (5) we include the five most robust growth controls (other than GDP per capita) 
according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003). And in column (6) we include the full 
set of variables robustly related to growth according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin 
(2003). Instruments always used are the log of TRgeofit and the product of this variable with the 
log of population in 1960. When GADP is included in the specification, we use the fraction of 
people speaking English at birth (EngL), the fraction of people speaking one of the five primary 
European languages at birth (EuroL), and distance from the equator (AbsLati) as additional 
instruments. The included controls are also used as instruments. ** significant 5% level; * 10% 
level (significant “other controls” are not marked). 
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Notes:  F-tests and p -values of the exclusion restriction of the excluded  instruments for each 
endogenous variable in the first-stage regressions. See the second row for the left-hand-side 
variable of these regressions. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Endogenous variable  LogROpen   LogROpen* 
LogPop60            
GADP      
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Table 5. Log Nominal openness (TSLS) 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Extent-of-Market Controls                      
               
LogNOpen    2.96*  2.75  3.40**  3.19*  2.03  1.87 
    (1.64)  (1.68)  (1.69)  (1.66)  (1.48)  (1.53) 
LogNOpen* LogPop60    -0.22  -0.20  -0.30*  -0.29*  -0.28**  -0.28** 
    (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
LogPop60    1.15  1.01  1.41**  1.36*  0.84  0.79 
    (0.70)  (0.70)  (0.70)  (0.69)  (0.59)  (0.62) 
P-value Hypothesis               
Trade Insignificant     0.097  0.140  0.132  0.160  0.073  0.043 
               
               
 Other Controls                      
               
LogPCGDP60    -1.76  -1.50  -0.83  -0.80  -1.51  -1.33 
    (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.32)  (0.27)  (0.35)  (0.24) 
GADP    5.66    4.91    1.54   
    (2.44)    (2.26)    (4.73)   
RLAW      1.29    1.17    -0.13 
      (0.54)    (0.44)    (0.78) 





























Sample Size    98  98  98  98  95  95 
P-value Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
  0.18  0.21  0.04  0.09  0.59 
0.57 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is log(PCGDP96/PCGDP60)*100/36, where PCGDP stands for PPP GDP 
per capita. Two-stage least-squares (TSLS) estimation. All regressions include a constant. LogNOpen is the log 
of average nominal openness 1960-1996. GADP (government anti-diversion policies) is the variable for 
institutional quality used in Hall and Jones (1999). RLAW is the rule of law index of Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-
Lobaton (2002). In columns (1) and (2) we include the two most important growth controls (other than initial 
GDP per capita) according to Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b). In column (3) and (4) we include the three most robust 
growth control (other than initial GDP per capita) according to Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003). 
And in column (5) and (6) we include t he full set of variables robustly related to growth according to 
Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2003). Instruments always used are the log of geography-fitted nominal 
openness (instead of geography-fitted real openness), the product of this variable with the log of population in 
1960, the fraction of people speaking English at birth (EngL), the fraction of people speaking one of the five 
primary European languages at birth (EuroL), and distance from the equator (AbsLati). The included controls 
are a lso used as instruments.  ** significant 5% level; * 10% level  (significant “other controls” are  not 




 Table 6. Real openness in former colonies (TSLS) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Extent-of-Market Controls                    
             
LogROpen    6.57**  5.12*  5.30**  5.51**  6.32** 
    (2.33)  (2.65)  (2.23)  (2.03)  (2.01) 
LogROpen*LogPop60    -0.58**  -0.45*  -0.47**  -0.51**  -0.58** 
    (0.25)  (0.29)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
LogPop60    4.81**  3.75*  3.90**  4.11**  4.66** 
    (1.95)  (2.24)  (1.85)  (1.66)  (1.67) 
P-value Hypothesis             
Trade Insignificant     0.013  0.085  0.042  0.021  0.006 
             
Other Controls             
             
             
LogPCGDP60    -0.56  -0.98  -0.98  -1.03  -0.74 
    (0.37)  (0.40)  (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.33) 
RLAW    1.16  1.15  1.07  0.90  0.85 
    (0.59)  (0.76)  (0.47)  (0.43)  (0.50) 
Prim60      2.08  1.87  1.21   
      (1.50)  (0.95)  (0.95)   
LifExp60      -0.009       
      (0.05)       
Sub-Sahara          -1.08  -1.22 
          (0.44)  (0.40) 
Sample Size    67  65  65  65  67 
P-value Overidentifying 
Restrictions 
  0.11  0.18  0.17  0.34 
0.31 
 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is log(PCGDP96/PCGDP60)*100/36, where PCGDP stands for 
PPP GDP per capita. Two-stage least-squares (TSLS) estimation. All regressions include a 
constant. LogROpen is the log of average real openness 1960-1996. RLAW is the rule of law index 
of Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoido-Lobaton (2002). Instruments always used are the log of TRgeofit, and 
the product of this variable with the log of population in 1960, as well as the log of historic settler 
mortality (LogMort) and the fraction of Europeans in 1900 (Euro1900) from AJR (2001). The 
included controls are also used as instruments. ** significant 5% level; * 10% level (significant 
“other controls” are not marked). 
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Notes:  F-tests and p -values of the exclusion restriction of the excluded instruments for each 
endogenous variable in the first-stage regressions. See the second row for the left-hand-side 
variable of these regressions.  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Endogenous variable  LogROpen   LogROpen* 
LogPop60            
RLAW      
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Table 8. Real openness and GADP (Fuller LIML) 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is log(PCGDP96/PCGDP60)*100/36, where PCGDP stands for PPP GDP per capita. Fuller LIML estimates using two values of the 
Fuller constant: 4 and 1. All regressions include a constant. The specifications follow Table 3. ** significant 5% level; * 10% level (significant “other controls” are not
marked). 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
      Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant 
Extent-of-Market Controls     4  1  4  1  4  1  4  1  4  1  4  1 
                                         
LogROpen     5.57**  5.66**  3.81**  3.92**  2.97**  3.05**  2.98**  2.95**  2.78**  2.79**  2.15*  2.15* 
      (1.49)  (1.53)  (1.78)  (1.91)  (1.42)  (1.52)  (1.33)  (1.39)  (1.13)  (1.19)  (1.17)  (1.27) 
LogROpen*Log(Pop60)     -0.39**  -0.39**  -0.29*  -0.29  -0.24*  -0.24  -0.28**  -0.27**  -0.26**  -0.25**  -0.26**  -0.28** 
      (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
LogPop60     3.67**  3.68**  2.62*  2.66*  2.14*  2.17*  2.38**  2.33**  2.25**  2.21**  1.93**  2.01** 
      (1.29)  (1.32)  (1.42)  (1.51)  (1.16)  (1.23)  (1.09)  (1.13)  (0.95)  (1.00)  (0.91)  (0.97) 
P-value Hypothesis                           
Trade Insignificant    0.005  0.01  0.072  0.058  0.076  0.086  0.083  0.09  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.05 
Other Controls 
                         
                           
LogPCGDP60    -0.34  0.37  -0.77  -0.76  -1.62  -1.62  0.79  -0.81  -1.54  -1.56  -1.37  -1.28 
    (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.45)  (0.49)  (0.33)  (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.35)  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.33)  (0.40) 
GADP           4.34  4.11  3.89  3.86  3.42  3.56  3.38  3.66  1.95  0.73 
            (3.09)  (3.44)  (2.72)  (3.06)  (2.54)  (2.75)  (2.40)  (2.67)  (3.40)  (4.54) 
   Control Variables Used 
  








Prot, Priex, Latin, 
Subs, Rerd 
Sample Size     98  98  98  98  98  94 
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 Table 9. Real openness in former colonies (Fuller LIML) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
      Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant  Fuller Constant 
Extent-of-Market Controls     4  1  4  1  4  1  4  1  4  1 
                                 
LogROpen    6.5**  6.65**  5.1**  5.1*  5.11**  5.39**  5.12**  5.5**  5.99**  6.33** 
    (2.23)  (2.47)  (2.3)  (2.8)  (2.1)  (2.30)  (1.89)  (2.02)  (1.87)  (2.01) 
LogROpen*Log(Pop60)    -0.58**  -0.57**  -0.46*  -0.44  -0.46**  -0.46*  -0.48**  -0.51**  -0.55**  -0.58** 
    (0.24)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.31)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
LogPop60    4.82*  4.79**  3.82*  3.79*  3.83**  3.93**  3.84**  4.11**  4.44**  4.67** 
    (1.86)  (2.06)  (1.99)  (2.37)  (1.74)  (1.91)  (1.55)  (1.65)  (1.57)  (1.67) 
P-value Hypothesis                       
Trade Insignificant    0.009  0.02  0.06  0.09  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.004  0.006 
                       
Other Controls                       
                       
LogPCGDP60    -0.54  -0.59  -0.98  -0.98  -0.98  -0.98  -1.04  -1.03  -0.75  -0.74 
    (0.33)  (0.39)  (0.37)  (0.41)  (0.37)  (0.41)  (0.34)  (0.36)  (0.32)  (0.34) 
RLAW    1.15  1.15  1.06  1.2  1.06  1.08  0.91  0.91  0.88  0.85 
    (0.55)  (0.61)  (0.65)  (0.82)  (0.43)  (0.48)  (0.38)  (0.42)  (0.44)  (0.49) 
             
   Control Variables Used 
  
   Prim60, LifExp60  Prim60  Prim60, Sub-Sahara  Sub-Sahara 
Sample Size       67  65  65  65 
 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is log(PCGDP96/PCGDP60)*100/36, where PCGDP stands for PPP GDP per capita. Fuller LIML estimates using two values of 
the Fuller constant: 4 and 1. All regressions include a constant. The specifications follow Table 6. ** significant 5% level; * 10% level (significant “other 
controls” are not marked). 
 